## REVIEWER AUDIT - RETURNED FOR SECURITY ISSUE
### Critical Security Vulnerability: Missing Authorization
The `approve` and `reject` endpoints can be called by **ANY authenticated agent**, including workers who could approve their own deletion requests.
**The Problem:**
```ruby
def approve
request.approve!(reviewer: current_agent, notes: params[:notes]) # NO AUTH CHECK
```
**Ticket Requirement:**
> "Human approval flow"
> "Only humans (or Orchestrator with special privilege?) can approve"
**What's Needed:**
Add authorization to ensure only human agents can approve/reject:
```ruby
before_action :require_human_agent, only: [:approve, :reject]
private
def require_human_agent
unless current_agent.agent_type == "human"
render json: { error: "Unauthorized - only human agents can approve deletion requests" }, status: :forbidden
end
end
```
### What IS Good ✓
- Model implementation is correct with proper validations
- Test coverage is excellent (42 passing specs)
- Audit logging is present
- Feature behavior matches acceptance criteria
### Action Required
1. Add `require_human_agent` before_action for approve/reject
2. Add tests verifying non-human agents cannot approve
3. Consider adding optional orchestrator approval if desired
The implementation is solid - it just needs the authorization check that was explicitly required by the ticket.
